2012 State of the industry

October Research has published there 2012 "State of the Industry".  It is available for free at http://www.thetitlereport.com/TTR/IndustryReport2012.aspx .  It contains sections about:

Real Estate
Gradual housing recovery expected, but sleeper issues creeping up

Title Insurance
Distressed market to define title insurance business in 2012


Homebuilders
Homebuilders in 2011: Bubble states hold down housing starts


Mortgage
Consumer confidence improves, but mortgage markets remain constricted


Appraisal
Appraisal industry battles continue into 2012


Settlement Services Law
Business-changing issues loom in 2012


RESPA
RESPA in 2012: The evolution of a titan


The Dodd-Frank Act
Dodd-Frank in 2012: big issues, little certainty

 

Filed under  //  Dodd-Frank   Florida Real Estate   Mortgage Fraud   REspa   appraisals   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

Cleveland home buyer's beef leads to Supreme Court case - Cleveland Business News - Northeast Ohio and Cleveland - Crain's Cleveland Business

The U.S. Supreme Court today hears arguments in a major consumer case that traces its origins to a lawsuit a Cleveland home buyer filed against her title insurance company.

Reuters says the dispute, which pits big business against consumer groups, gets at a fundamental question: whether a person has to suffer legal harm to sue a company over an alleged kickback it got.

The Cleveland home buyer, Denise Edwards, “sued her title insurance company under a 1974 federal real estate settlement law that bars kickbacks and certain referral fee arrangements,” Reuters reports. The news service says Ms. Edwards paid First American Financial Corp $455 for title insurance as part of a home purchase in 2006 while the seller paid an additional $273. She alleges that First American “had an arrangement with her Ohio settlement agency to refer title insurance business exclusively to First American — the alleged kickback.”

Reuters notes that her attorneys argued that Congress, in adopting the 1974 law, “created a sufficient basis for her to sue and that courts have long recognized an individual's interest to receive services free of kickbacks or other conflicts of interest.”

Backing the title company are organizations representing home builders, title insurance companies and mortgage bankers, as well as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The story, unfortunately, doesn't do a good job explaining their view of the case. But Kevin Walsh, a University of Richmond assistant law professor, tells Reuters that oral arguments before the court could provide clues on whether the justices are likely to rule broadly or narrowly.

"A broad ruling could either vindicate or constrict statutory damages provisions in laws designed to protect information privacy, to regulate debt collection and to set standards for credit reporting," he says, citing other laws that could be affected.

Filed under  //  Supreme court   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

CFPB - Round 4 - New TIL/GFE Form Prototypes

by Wyatt Bell | 2011/09/13 |

The CFPB has issued the 4th round of proposed changes to the TIL/GFE combined format. These may be viewed at CFPB website: Know Before You Owe

Wyatt Bell's Blog ::

Any thoughts that "itemization" may reappear for title fees and policies have ended in the latest revisions to the proposed GFE forms.

Round4-jasmine

Round4-nandina 

Notice that items A through F have been discontinued in this version of the forms. Items A through F, which appeared in previous versions, would have corresponded with the GFE# numbering system currently in use.

It may be that the CFPB understands the enormous cost of implementing new HUD calculations and forms and is dovetailing into the current HUD 1/1A forms for minimal changes. I would expect the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to begin entering the picture with new HUD 1/1A forms which will still need revision to fit with the proposed changes.

After all the energy expended in explaining the difficulties with "non-itemization" it appears the "non-itemization" proponents have won!

Keep in mind the forms are the same. The differences are in the loan quote information. The Nandina has the lower "Estimated Cash to Close" while the Jasmine has the lower APR. If one is looking at out-of-pocket they may be tempted towards the higher cost loan which is counter-intuitive. This example has a mere $88.00 difference in "Estimated Cash to Close".

However, in the real world as the "Estimated Cash to Close" vs. the loan terms becomes wider it will be more difficult to choose. Does one pay more at settlement for less payments??

That's the problem with these prototypes. The terms are framed very simply - there's no empirical evidence that these forms will result in prospective borrower(s) choosing the most favorable loan terms! Many other factors are at play, especially since "non-itemization" hides potential advantages!

And it must also be considered that even though the Nandina APR is higher it may, indeed, turn out to be lower! The adjustment begins at the 4th year which means the interest rate could actually be lower from years 4, 5 and 6 whereas the Jasmine is stuck at 3.75% for the full 7 years. Just look at the bond market for the last 30 years - interest rates have been on a downtrend the whole way! And with The Fed stating they are holding rates at or near 0% into 2013 one could arguably go for the higher loan APR.

The APR adjustment is based upon the assumption that the initial rate will increase which is not always the case. How much refi business has been generated over the last 2 decades because rates decrease?

Filed under  //  CFPB   title fees   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

Current CFPB authority - Lexology

Because the Director of the CFPB has not yet been appointed and confirmed, some of the authority that was delegated to the CFPB under the Dodd-Frank Act cannot yet be invoked. The Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board issued a joint letter on January 10, 2011, regarding CFPB authority with and without a Director in place. Without a Senate-confirmed Director by the designated Transfer Date, the two agencies concluded that section 1066(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act grants the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to carry out the functions of the Bureau found under subtitle F of title X. On the designated Transfer Date, subtitle F grants the Bureau the authority to: (1) prescribe rules, issue orders, and produce guidance related to the federal consumer financial laws that were, prior to the designated Transfer Date, within the authority of the FRB, OCC, OTS, FDIC, and NCUA; (2) conduct examinations (for federal consumer financial law purposes) of banks, savings associations, and credit unions with total assets in excess of $10 billion, and any affiliates thereof; (3) prescribe rules, issue guidelines, and conduct a study or issue a report (with certain limitations) under the enumerated consumer laws that were previously within the authority of the FTC prior to the designated Transfer Date; (4) conduct all consumer protection functions relating to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act that were previously within the authority of HUD prior to the designated Transfer Date; (5) enforce all orders, resolutions, determinations, agreements, and rulings that have been issued, prior to the designated Transfer Date, by any transferor agency or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of consumer financial protection functions that are transferred to the Bureau, with respect to a bank, savings association, or credit union with total assets in excess of $10 billion, and any affiliates thereof; and (6) replace the FRB, OCC, OTS, FDIC, NCUA, and HUD in any lawsuit or proceeding that was commenced by or against one of the transferor agencies prior to the designated Transfer Date, with respect to a consumer financial protection function transferred to the Bureau.      

The Treasury Secretary is not permitted to perform certain newly established Bureau authorities if there is no confirmed Director by the designated Transfer Date. Accordingly, without a Senate-confirmed Director, the Treasury is not permitted to exercise the Bureau’s authority to: (1) prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices under subtitle C in connection with consumer financial products and services; (2) prescribe rules and require model disclosure forms under subtitle C to ensure that the features of a consumer financial product or service are fairly, accurately, and effectively disclosed, both initially and over the term of the product or service; (3) prescribe rules under section 1022 relating to, among other things, the filing of limited reports to the Bureau for the purpose of determining whether a nondepository institution should be supervised by the Bureau; and (4) supervise nondepository institutions under section 1024, including the authority to (a) prescribe rules defining the scope of nondepository institutions subject to the Bureau’s supervision, (b) prescribe rules establishing record-keeping requirements that the Bureau determines are needed to facilitate nondepository supervision, and (c) conduct examinations of nondepository institutions.

While there are some who do not agree with the Treasury’s analysis, there appears to be a consensus that the CFPB can perform all consumer financial protection functions of the FRB, OCC, OTS, FDIC, FTC, NCUA, and HUD in connection with issuing regulations under existing consumer financial protection laws. It cannot, however, carry out new functions provided to the CFPB under the Dodd-Frank Act, such as prohibiting unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with consumer products and services; prescribing rules and requiring model disclosures to ensure that features of consumer financial products or services are fairly, accurately, and effectively disclosed; or supervising non-depository institutions.

Filed under  //  title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

the doctrine of merger of title

I saw this question posted online:

 

The mortgage crisis has brought with it a record number of foreclosures.  Not surprisingly, deeds in lieu of foreclosure have also become much more common.  Generally, the doctrine of merger of title holds that when a greater and lesser estate coincide and meet in the same person, the lesser estate is merged with the greater. The question then becomes, does the deed in lieu have the effect of extinguishing the lender's mortgage lien? 

 

I asked Phil Noce of Elite Title what he thought.  He answered this way:

I remember researching this issue in my younger days at Chicago Title.  If the deed makes a specific reference that it is for the purpose of satisfying the existing mortgage, nothing further will be required.  If it is just a deed to the lender without such a reference the question of intent  comes into play and the title companies have always taken the position that the mortgage must be cancelled of record.  I have seen deeds which stated that the mortgage is to remain open.

 

The main problem with a deed in lieu of foreclosure is junior liens.  In a foreclosure junior liens can be cut off, but if the lender accepts a deed in lieu of foreclosure that lender takes subject to all outstanding liens.  That is why it is necessary to do a search to make sure the are no other liens before such a deed is accepted.

 

 

Filed under  //  merger of title   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

I don't know if this is true but it's funny

Rebuilding New Orleans caused residents often to be challenged with the task of tracing home titles back potentially hundreds of years.

With a community rich with history stretching back over two centuries,
houses have been passed along through generations of family, sometimes making it quite difficult to establish ownership. Here's a great letter an attorney wrote to the FHA on behalf of a client:   You have to love this lawyer...

        A New Orleans lawyer sought an FHA loan for a client. He was told the loan would be granted if he could prove satisfactory title to a parcel of property being offered as collateral. The title to the property dated back to 1803, which took the lawyer three months to track down. After sending the information to the FHA, he received the following reply:
        (Actual reply from the FHA): 

        "Upon review of your letter adjoining your client's loan application, we note that the request is supported by an Abstract of Title. While we compliment the able manner in which you have prepared and presented the application, we must point out that you have only cleared title to the proposed collateral property back to 1803. Before final approval can be accorded, it will be necessary to clear the title back to its origin."

         Annoyed, the lawyer responded as follows: 

        (Actual response):

        "Your letter regarding title in Case No.189156 has been received. I note that you wish to have title extended further than the 206 years covered by the present application.

        I was unaware that any educated person in this country, particularly those working in the property area, would not know that Louisiana was purchased by the United States from France in 1803, the year of origin identified in our application. For the edification of uninformed FHA bureaucrats, the title to the land prior to U.S. ownership was obtained from France , which had acquired it by Right of Conquest from Spain . The land came into the possession of Spain by Right of Discovery made in the year 1492 by a sea captain named Christopher Columbus, who had been granted the privilege of seeking a new route to India by the Spanish monarch, Queen
Isabella.

        The good Queen Isabella, being a pious woman and almost as careful about titles as the FHA, took the precaution of securing the blessing of the Pope before she sold her jewels to finance Columbus's expedition. Now the Pope, as I'm sure you may know, is the emissary of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and God, it is commonly accepted, created this world. Therefore, I believe it is safe to presume that God also made that part of the world called Louisiana . God, therefore, would be the owner of origin and His
origins date back to before the beginning of time, the world as we know it, and the FHA. I hope you find God's original claim to be satisfactory. Now, may we have our loan?" 

        The loan was immediately approved. And you want our government running the health care?

Filed under  //  title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

New Jersey Title

I heard today that New Jersey Title was closed down by the Dept of Banking and Insurance.  Anybody have details?

Filed under  //  new jersey title insurance.   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

Is your driveway a principal use?

What will be the title implications of this decision?

From :

According to the  New Jersey Supreme Court, in certain circumstances the answer is yes.  On June 16, 2011, the Court held that a driveway is a principal use where, pursuant to local zoning, the driveway does not meet the definition of an accessory use.  Moreover, depending on the circumstances, you may need difficult to obtain and costly variances to get your driveway approved.  How could this happen?    

The answer lies in the curious case of Nuckey v. Borough of Little Ferry Planning Bd.  These are the facts. A developer owns multiple lots and wants to build a hotel.  One of the lots has no highway access. To remedy this issue, the developer proposes to build a driveway on an adjacent lot that would continue across the corner of another lot owned by the same principals as the developer.  This proposed driveway would provide the needed highway access for the hotel.  Sounds like a simple accessory use right? Herein lies the rub.

The local land use ordinance in this case defines an accessory use as “ a use which is customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use of a lot or a building and which is located on the same lot.”  Because the driveway serves a different lot, it cannot be accessory.  Therefore, the driveway is a principal use. 

This, however, is not the end of our story.  It turns out that there was a pre-existing, non-conforming use on the same lot as the proposed driveway.   As a result, the proposed driveway was deemed a second principal use and the expansion of the pre-existing, non-conforming use.  Thus the developer was required to obtain use variances pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(1) and  (d)(2) respectively.

But wait, despite these facts, aren’t we just talking about a driveway?  Surely there must be some de minimis exception for a small driveway?  This is precisely the argument that was raised by the developer.  In fact, the de minimus argument was successful in the Appellate Division.  However, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the courts have never applied the de minimis rationale in considering the need for a use variance to permit an otherwise prohibited use.  Where, as here, the zoning ordinance permits only one principal use, the addition of an entirely new principal use is prohibited and, by its very nature, cannot be inconsequential. Put plainly, “[a]lthough access may be a reason for granting a variance, it is not a justification for dispensing with one. “

This case serves as a reminder that every land use matter is truly unique.  Even something as simple as a driveway, traditionally an accessory use, can turn out to be a legal conundrum.

Filed under  //  title agency   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

HUD and FNF Settle RESPA Kick-Back Charges to the Tune of $4.5 Million

The U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD) has announced an agreement with Fidelity National Financial Inc. (FNF) to settle allegations the title company paid real estate brokers and other settlement service providers improper kickbacks or referral fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). HUD claimed FNF and its affiliates and subsidiaries engaged in a widespread and years-long campaign to pay real estate brokers kickbacks for the referral of real estate settlement services, including home warranties and title insurance. FNF agreed to cease this practice and pay HUD $4.5 million to resolve the complaint.

“RESPA is very clear that paying fees or providing anything of value for the simple act of referring business is a violation of law,” said Acting FHA Commissioner Robert Ryan. “This agreement should be a signal to others that these business practices won’t be tolerated.”

HUD alleges that Fidelity National Financial Inc. (FNF), through its subsidiaries, paid fees for the referral of settlement service business in violation of Section 8 of RESPA. To facilitate these payments, real estate brokerages entered into “Application Service Provider Agreements” which provided the real estate brokerages access to TransactionPoint, a web-based platform that automates the real estate transaction from listing to closing. This online system also allows the brokers to select real estate settlement providers for a particular real estate transaction. The real estate brokerages, in turn, entered into Sub-License Agreements with subsidiaries of FNF to enable FNF’s subsidiaries to be listed in TransactionPoint as a provider of settlement services. As part of the Sub-Licensee Agreement, HUD alleges that FNF’s subsidiaries paid the real estate brokerages a fee for each referral of real estate settlement services.

 RESPA was enacted in 1974 to provide consumers advance disclosures of settlement charges and to prohibit illegal kickbacks and excessive fees in the homebuying process. Section 8 of RESPA prohibits a person from giving or accepting anything of value in exchange for the referral of settlement service business.

Filed under  //  Fidelity National Financial    REspa   kickbacks   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald 

Wells Fargo v. Commonwealth: the death knell for equitable subrogation? - Lexology

Lenders, title insurance companies and their agents should be aware that on April 21, 2011, the Supreme Court of Kentucky issued a decision that could have a significant effect on Kentucky courts’ application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation in Kentucky.  Wells Fargo Bank, Minnesota, N.A. v. Commonwealth, --- S.W.3d ---, 2011 WL 1620578 (Ky. Apr. 21, 2011).  While not often litigated at the appellate level (in part because of its widely accepted application), the doctrine of equitable subrogation has long been a reliable tool used by lenders and their title insurance companies to ensure that mortgage loans intended to have first priority actually receive that first priority position.  But the Wells Fargo decision limits the doctrine’s application to such an extent that it could threaten the viability of equitable subrogation in Kentucky on a going-forward basis.     

Where is your state on Equitable Subrogation?

Filed under  //  new jersey title insurance   title insurance  
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Posted by Art Oswald